Proponents of the language of thought (LOT) thesis are realists when it comes to syntactically structured representations, and must defend their view against instrumentalists, who would claim that syntactic structures may be useful in describing cognition, but have no more causal powers in governing cognition than do the equations of physics in guiding the planets. This paper explores what it will take to provide an argument for LOT that can defend its conclusion from instrumentalism. I illustrate a difficulty in this (...) project by discussing arguments for LOT put forward by Horgan and Tienson. When their evidence is viewed in the light of results in connectionist research, it is hard to see how a realist conception of syntax can be formulated and defended. (shrink)

The critics have not been generous towards Valerius Flaccus' Argonautica as a whole, but their praise of his Medea episode, whether moderate or immoderate, has been fairly unanimous. W. C. Summers writes: ‘Valerius manages to treat the same theme with originality and power; in psychological probability his version seems to me superior to anything that has reached us from antiquity’. And J. M. K. Martin: ‘Where he displayed the most distinct originality, where he parted company with the Alexandrian poet with (...) greatest advantage to himself and his readers, is in the treatment of the episode of Medea and Jason’. Earlier articles of mine have endeavoured to illustrate Valerius' basic originality, i.e. that, however much he takes over from others, the final product is something new and distinctive. (shrink)

Can we understand conscious experience? It can seem that the answer is ‘no’. Even when we have well-supported cognitive accounts of consciousness, such as global workspace theory, experience itself seems to elude our grasp. It is easy to see how a global workspace might be a useful adaptation, much harder to see what role is played by conscious experience. For instance, if I'm looking for a blue notebook, why do I need to experience colours? Why wouldn't it suffice to have (...) an unconscious mechanism that recognized colours, and could make such information available to other systems? Why couldn't the mechanisms of the workspace operate without experience at all? (shrink)